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Abstract We study a principal-agent model in which the (effort-dependent) reali-
sation of output levels is ambiguous, and the agent is ambiguity averse (while the
principal is ambiguity neutral). We show that introducing ambiguity aversion will
lower profits if the action that the principal wants to implement is the most ambiguous
one, while they may increase otherwise. Regarding the design of the optimal con-
tract, we show that under ambiguity aversion the optimal incentive scheme may not be
monotone even if a natural generalization of the monotone likelihood ratio property is
satisfied, and illustrate how this fact could affect the design of contracts in an applied
economic context. We also find that the individual rationality constraint need not bind
in the presence of ambiguity aversion unless preferences satisfy constant absolute
ambiguity aversion.
Keywords Moral hazard · Ambiguity aversion · Optimal contract
JEL Classification D81 · D86 · M52
1 Introduction
In its most standard form the principal-agent problem is typically described in the
following way. The owner of a firm, the principal, has to decide how to remunerate
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a manager, the agent, who is in charge of running the firm. The effort of the agent
determines, to a large extent, the quantity produced by the firm, but the firm’s output
is also influenced by random events that are beyond the control of the manager. The
problem arises as the manager’s effort cannot be observed (or otherwise inferred) by
the principal.
As it is commonly assumed that the principal is risk neutral and the agent risk averse,
the solution to this problem arises as the optimal trade-off between risk-sharing and
incentives. Thus it should be apparent that the optimal wage scheme is sensitive to the
agent’s reaction to non-deterministic payoffs. Most of the literature assumes that the
agent (and the principal) are expected utilitymaximisers. In the context of the principal-
agent problem, the expected utility framework requires the agent to treat the uncertainty
about her monetary payoffs in the same way as a lottery over monetary prizes with
known probabilities. The well-known Ellsberg paradox however has convincingly
cast some doubt at the validity of such an assumption (Ellsberg 1961). In response,
the decision theory literature has generalised the expected utility model to accom-
modate aversion (as well as other attitudes) towards ambiguity, which can explain
the behaviour observed in the Ellsberg paradox. Specifically, ambiguity is defined as
subjective uncertainty about outcome distributions. Our paper addresses the question
to what extent the traditional analysis of the principal-agent problem remains valid in
situations where ambiguity about the consequences of the agent’s actions prevails.
Why might ambiguity be of particular interest in the principal-agent problem? In
many cases where moral hazard arises in economic interactions, it seems reasonable
to assume that the consequences of the agent’s actions cannot be described with great
confidence by a single probability distribution. A good example may be a firm that
employs a scientist to develop a new production technique. Yet, in other instances
ambiguity may well be less of an issue. If the principal routinely contracts with some
agent to do always essentially the same task, then it should be possible to have a
precise understanding about the consequences of each of the agent’s actions. This
might be true for the relationship between a firm and one of her sales agents. Thus, our
approach also enables us to address the question how the optimal incentive schemewill
differ between such situations. Additionally, ambiguity can vary between the actions
available to the agent. Consider again a scientist: For her, exerting a lot of effort to
develop an entirely new approach may have very ambiguous benefits. Exerting low
effort (by merely adopting an existing technology) may still not lead to a deterministic
outcome, but there may be less ambiguity about the outcome distribution. For the case
of a “routine” principal-agent situation only the action which is in fact implemented in
equilibrium might be well understood. The other actions available to the agents might
very well be of ambiguous consequences (as they are never actually chosen).1
In the principal-agent problem the optimal incentive contract is, in general, ineffi-
cient. That is, if the principal could observe the action chosen by the agent she could
offer a different wage scheme that makes her better off without harming the agent.
As long as the optimal incentive scheme does not leave any rent to the agent, the
1 This point has been raised first byGhirardato (1994). The observation that ambiguitymight differ between
actions (or outcomes) will actually turn out to be of some importance in determining when ambiguity
decreases the principal’s profit.
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degree of inefficiency is directly linked to the principal’s profit. Therefore, we want
to find out whether profits necessarily decrease when ambiguity matters. Ambiguity
may also affect other properties of the optimal incentive scheme. Wage schedules are
often expected to be monotonic. This means that if an outcome realises that is better
for the principal, the agent receives a higher wage as well. Even without ambiguity
additional assumptions are needed to ensure the optimality of monotonic schemes.
Thus we seek to show whether similar assumptions are sufficient in the presence of
ambiguity, or if stronger assumptions are needed.
To address these questions we adopt a recent model of decision making under
ambiguity, the smooth ambiguitymodel (Klibanoff et al. 2005). This is a key difference
between this paper and the work by Ghirardato (1994) (which predates the smooth
model), who studies the principal-agent problem with a different model of ambiguity.
In his paper, the agents use capacities insteadof probabilities,which are evaluatedusing
Schmeidler’s Choquet expected utility theory (Schmeidler 1989). A major advantage
of using the smooth ambiguity model is that it suggests a clear distinction between
ambiguity and attitude towards ambiguity, and allows each to vary separately, while
in the Choquet expected utility model these two concepts cannot be separated.2 For
most parts of the paper, we assume that absolute ambiguity aversion is constant. We
will show that without this assumption the individual rationality constraint might not
bind in the optimal contract, so that the agent can be strictly better off than under her
outside option.
Lang (forthcoming) contains a result complementary to this paper for the case of
infinitely many effort levels. He finds that under the smooth ambiguity model (and
other second-order models) a strictly positive effort level is typically optimal while
under first order models of ambiguity aversion, like themaxmin expected utility model
(Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989) or the Choquet expected utility model, zero effort may
be optimal in some circumstances. Lopomo et al. (2011) show that given Bewley
preferences (which can be interpreted as ambiguity averse preferences), the optimal
contractmay be coarser due to ambiguity. Contracting under vague information is stud-
ied inViero (2012), the effects of loss aversion are investigated inHerweg et al. (2010).
Carroll (2015) find that ambiguity about available actions can lead to linear contracts.
Di Tillio et al. (2014) and Bose and Renou (2014) provide rationales for designing
ambiguous contracts even if there is initially no ambiguity about the relevant distribu-
tions. We restrict ourselves instead to studying standard (i.e. unambiguous) contracts
in an exogeneously ambiguous setting. For the case of more than one agent, Kellner
(2015) shows ambiguity aversion can make the use of tournaments more attractive.
Other papers related to moral hazard and ambiguity are Mukerji (1998, 2003). For
other more distantly related papers on the implications of ambiguity in economics see
the survey byMukerji and Tallon (2004). Also of interest, as another application of the
smooth ambiguity model, in this case to portfolio choice, is Gollier (2011). While it
is beyond the scope of this introduction to give an overview of the contributions to the
principal-agent literature, it is worth mentioning that our formulation of the problem
2 To achieve this separation between ambiguity and ambiguity aversion the smooth ambiguity model
assumes that the agent’s preferences over second-order acts (bets on the true probability) can be observed.
See Epstein (2010) for a critical discussion.
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most directly corresponds to Grossman and Hart (1983) (henceforth GH), which we
also use as a reference when we compare our results to the case without ambiguity
aversion.
Even in the absence of ambiguity, very few general results regarding properties
of the optimal contract are available.3 Hence, we will follow established practice
of restricting the model to special cases, most notably the case of two actions and
two outcomes, as this allows us to highlight important channels how ambiguity and
ambiguity aversion matters.
Regarding the shape of the optimal contract, we will build on the observation of
Ghirardato (1994), who finds that, under ambiguity, non-monotonicity may arise even
in the case of only two outcomes. We will however also show that in many cases
the optimal wage contract will nevertheless entail a positive bonus to the agent if
the better outcome realises, for instance if it is in a certain sense unambiguous that
the high-cost action results more likely in a better outcome. On the other hand, we
identify a new source of non-monotonicity for the case of at least three outcomes:
Non-monotonicities may arise if there is more ambiguity about the probability of
some outcomes than others. Then the principal might aim at reducing the ambiguity
about wages by keeping them similar between the more ambiguous outcomes. We
will argue using an example that this effect is not simply a curiosity, but may be quite
relevant in the context of real-world incentive contracts.
In addition to describing the optimalwage contract, we provide some insight on how
the principal’s profits change in response to changes in the problem. In particular, as
the smooth ambiguity model provides a separation between ambiguity and ambiguity
aversion, we can study an increase in ambiguity and an increase in ambiguity aver-
sion separately. We will show that these two changes may have very different effects.
Replacing an ambiguity neutral agent with an ambiguity averse agent, for instance,
will be bad for the principal, if she wants to implement the most ambiguous action. If
the principal implements the least ambiguous action, then ambiguity aversion might
actually increase profits, in marked contrast to the introduction of risk aversion in the
standard model. The intuition behind this finding is that, while ambiguity aversion
always makes the incentive constraint harder to satisfy, the effect on the individual
rationality constraints depends on which action is the more ambiguous one. The situ-
ation is different, however, for an increase in ambiguity. Using a suitable definition of
a uniform increase in ambiguity, we find that if ambiguity increases uniformly, then
the principal’s payoff may increase only if actually the most ambiguous action is to
be implemented. This follows since, given our specification of preferences, a payment
scheme that is based on the most ambiguous action is less affected from a further
increase in ambiguity than any less ambiguous payment scheme.
Finally, we look at the case of more than two actions, and show that, given smooth
ambiguity aversion, it may be the case that the binding incentive constraint in an
optimal contract pertains to a more expensive action. Table 1 summaries the main
differences between the expected utility approach, assuming ambiguity neutrality (col-
3 For instance, if there are more than two actions it is unclear which incentive constraint will be the relevant
one. Without assuming the monotone likelihood ratio property it is possible that the optimal contract is not
monotonic.
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Table 1 Properties of the optimal contract
Ambiguity neutrality Smooth ambiguity
aversion
Choquet EU
IR binding Yes No, requires, e.g., CAAA Yes
Monotonicity (binary
outcomes)















IC binds For cheaper action In either direction For cheaper action
umn 1), and the model allowing for smooth ambiguity aversion (column 2). Column 3
compares our results with the Choquet model using the results in Ghirardato (1994).
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Sect. 2 introduces the model.
Section 3 discusses the properties of the optimal contract. It also motivates why we
restrict the model to the case of constant absolute ambiguity aversion in the remaining
parts of the paper. Section 4 discusses two properties of the optimal contract for the
case of two outcomes only, assuming for the larger part that there are only two actions:
First, we discuss sufficient conditions for the monotonicity of the optimal contract.
Second,we discuss comparative statics in ambiguity and ambiguity aversion. Section 5
discusses first the robustness of these results to the case of more than two outcomes,
and second to the case of more than two actions.
2 The model
In the standard formulation of the principal-agent problem, a principal (typically the
owner of a firm) has to hire an agent (a worker or manager) to perform a certain
task. The agent’s effort choice while doing this task cannot be observed directly, but
it determines the distribution of a random variable (the output of the firm). Only the
principal, not the agent, directly cares about the realisation of this random variable.
The principal’s problem is to design a payment scheme that incentivises the agent to
choose an action that is in the principal’s best interest, given the constraint that the
scheme cannot depend on the action choice itself.
We will assume that there are only finitely many output levels that the firm might
possibly achieve, which are elements of the finite set Q = {q1, . . . , qI }. As a conven-
tionwe require that qi < q j if i < j . As the principal can reward the agent based on the
output level only, the wage scheme can be represented by a vector w = (w1, . . . , wI ).
The agent can choose from a finite set of actions, A. Choosing an action a ∈ A incurs
an effort cost ca to the agent. The standard treatment of the principal-agent prob-
lem would now assume that in addition to the effort cost, each action a is identified
with a probability distribution pa ∈ (Q). That is, when the agent chooses action
a, the probability that the firm achieves output level qi is given by pi . Our approach
123
C. Kellner
differs here since we introduce ambiguity by assuming that both the principal and
the agent have a common but imperfect understanding of the (stochastic) relationship
between the actions and the consequences [as axiomatised by Klibanoff et al. (2005)].
Specifically, they are unsure about these probabilities and thus they think that a set
of probabilities might better describe the implications of each action. However, they
do not necessarily consider all members of that set equally likely, but assign different
likelihoods to them, which are specified by a probabilitymeasureμa defined on(Q).
To rule out any effects that may arise from information asymmetries, we assume that
both principal and agent use the same measure to evaluate each act.
To close the description of the agent’s preferences we assume, based on the
smooth ambiguity model, that they can be represented by the utility function U :







pi u(wi ) − ca
)
dμa(p).
In this representation, the increasing function u : (w,∞) → R represents the
agent’s attitude towards risk. We allow w to be −∞, but require that limw→w u(w) =
−∞. The function φ : R → R, represents the agent’s attitude towards ambiguity. We
assume that the agent is ambiguity averse, corresponding to a concave φ, and strictly
risk averse, corresponding to a strictly concave u.4 Typically our results carry over to
the case where the agent is risk neutral, provided she is strictly ambiguity averse.5
To interpret the utility representation, observe first that for all actions that can be
described by a single, unambiguous probability distribution (i.e. for all actions a where
μa puts weight 1 on some pa), the equation specialises to




pai u(wi ) − ca
)
.
Thus such actions are ranked by the agent in the same way as by an expected-utility
maximizer.
For ambiguous actions, the agent computes the expected utility associated to each
possible probability distribution in the same way in a first step. Then she weights the
resulting utilities according to her confidence in each probability distribution (given
by μa), after she has applied the transformation φ, which represents her ambiguity
attitude.Note that the functionu(a, w) = u(w)−ca determines the agent’s preferences
between effort costs andwage payments.We have implicitly assumed that this function
is additively separable, which is a common simplifying assumption. Note that due to
4 We additionally make the standard assumptions that u and φ are continuous and strictly increasing.
5 There are subtle differences however. It will become clear that the first best could be achieved under risk
neutrality despite strict ambiguity aversionwhenever there is nopayoff-relevant ambiguity about equilibrium
wages (for instance, when a unique probability is attributed to some subset of outcomes). Similarly, we
will point out that regarding the question whether at least one IC constraint binds, there is an important
difference.
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the presence of ambiguity this does not necessarily mean however, that the function
U (a,w) is additively separable.6
Sometimes it is convenient to assume that the support ofμa is finite for all actions. In
this case we write pi j for the probability of realizing output qi with action a according
to the j-th probability distribution and the number μaj denotes the weight assigned
to this distribution given action a. Then the agent’s utility of choosing action a given








pi j u(wi ) − ca
)
.
Finally, we turn to the principal’s payoff. We denote the firm’s payoff for action a
under payment scheme w by the function  : A × (w,∞)I → R. We assume the
firm is both ambiguity and risk neutral (Klibanoff et al. (2005) show that ambiguity
















The principal maximises expected net output (i.e. profit), where the expectation is
taken with respect to the μ-average distribution
∫
pi dμa .
The principal’s problem As the formulation of the principal’s problem differs from
Grossman and Hart (1983) only by the way the uncertainty is modelled, we will be
brief. It is generally useful to think about the principal’s problem in two stages: First,
she determines the cost of implementing each of the actions available to the agent. If
it is impossible to implement an action, we will say that the cost is infinity. Second,
she compares the benefits of each action with the implementation costs to determine
which action she wants to implement.
Implementing a given action Suppose that the principal wants to implement action
a using reward scheme w. The agent will work for the principal only if she prefers
doing so to the outside option, which corresponds to a certain utility level, φ(u0),
which does not depend on the output distribution. Moreover, the agent must (weakly)
prefer this action over any other action. Thus, the problem of optimally implementing
a given action a can be summarized as to maximise (a,w) by choosing w subject
to the constraints
U (a,w) ≥ φ(u0) (IR)
U (a,w) ≥ U (a′,w) ∀a′ ∈ A. (IC)









− ca . Also in this case, the agents would act indentical to expected
utility decision makers in the absence of ambiguity. Assuming constant absolute ambiguity aversion, the
two approaches become equivalent.
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It is important to observe that, when the agent is ambiguity neutral (φ affine) or
there is no ambiguity (μa degenerate for each action) this is exactly the standard GH
model. The very same arguments as used there establish that this problem always has
a solution. (This is formally stated and proven as Lemma 1 in the Appendix.)
3 The optimal incentive scheme
As mentioned in the introduction, even in the standard model it is not generally
straightforward to describe the optimal incentive scheme, at least not without making
additional assumptions about the model. Yet many interesting properties of the opti-
mal incentive scheme can be stated at least for some special cases of the model. In
this section we will present those (limited) results that hold even if we do not impose
any constraints on the structure of the problem (that is, we do not limit the number of
actions or outcomes), while in the larger part of Sect. 4 we focus on the most important
special case (two outcomes and two actions).
The first question we address is whether the agent’s IR constraint will bind, or
whether she might end up strictly better off than with her outside option. Recall that
in the standard model, the IR constraint will bind if utility is either additively (as we
have assumed before) or multiplicative separable in monetary reward and effort costs.
Example 1 In this example there are two actions, H and L , with cH > cL , and
two outcomes. Consider a decision maker with ambiguity attitude represented by the
function φ(u) = − exp(−√u/2). The high-cost action is ambiguous, weightμH1 = .7
is attributed to the distribution where the better outcome obtains for sure (pH21 = 1),
probability .3 to the probability distribution where the worse outcome is certain, i.e.
pH22 = 0. Action L unambiguously results in the better outcome with a probability of
.5, i.e. pL21 = pL22 = .5.7 In this example, the individual rationality constraint does not
bind in the optimal contract, for reasons illustrated in Fig. 1.
The graph depicts the agent’s indifference curves in a state-preference graph, where
the axes represent u(w1) and u(w2), the interim utilities the agent gets (resulting
from some wage scheme) in the two different states. As u is increasing, each point
in the graph corresponds to a particular wage scheme (w1, w2).8 The curve UH
represents all wage schemes that leave the agent indifferent between not working
for the principal (which results in the outside option without any effort costs), and
choosing the high-cost action H (after accepting the principal’s incentive scheme).
In other words, UH shows all the points (u(w1), u(w2)) such that the IR con-
straint binds, UH = {(u(w1), u(w2)) : U (H, (w1, w2)) = φ(u0)}, and points to
the right satisfy the constraint with a strict inequality. The curve UL represents all
incentive contracts that leave the agent indifferent between choosing the low-cost
action (if she accepts the contract) and refusing to work for the principal (which
7 To complete the example, assume effort costs are cH = .01 and cL = .092, and q2 − q1 is very large.
The outside option is given by φ(u0) = −1. A similar example can also be constructed for the case that
U (a,w) is additively separable in ca as suggested in Footnote 6.
8 Note that if the agent were risk neutral (i.e. u(w) = w) the labels of the axis could be reinterpreted as the
dollar amounts the agent receives in the two states.
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Fig. 1 The IR constraint need
not bind
again results in the outside option and the absence of any effort costs). Formally,
UL = {(u(w1), u(w2)) : U (L , (w1, w2)) = φ(u0)}. As the agent is ambiguity averse,
these indifference curves are convex. Now suppose that the principal wants to imple-
ment the high-cost action. If the IR constraint binds in an optimal wage scheme, the
utility pair corresponding to any feasible wage schedule would have to lie not only on
the schedule UH but also on or below the schedule UL . This follows since the incen-
tive compatibility constraint requires that the low-cost action cannot result in a higher
utility than the high-cost action, which in turn is indifferent to the outside option. But
the figure shows that this is impossible, as the UL schedule is always below the UH
schedule.
The schedule U ′H depicts the indifference curve of the agent (assuming she chooses
H ) that corresponds to a slightly higher utility level.9 Similarly, U ′L is the indifference
curve corresponding to the new utility level and the low-cost action. Assuming the
principal uses a payment scheme that is on the U ′H curve, she meets the IR constraint
(but it does not bind), and all points on this schedule that are also on or below the
curve U ′L meet the incentive constraint. Now the two curves do intersect (even at two
points, marked by small circles), so the points between the two intersections meet both
constraints. To gain intuition, note that H was disadvantaged compared to L not only
by being more costly, but also by being more ambiguous. At a higher utility level, the
second disadvantage is reduced given preferences with decreasing ambiguity aversion,
making it easier to implement H . Thus it is possible to implement the high-cost action
at finite cost.
As the principal is ambiguity neutral, the benefit of implementing action H is
directly proportional to q2−q1, and hence can be chosen arbitrarily large by chosing a
high enough q2. Therefore, there is indeed a concrete principal-agent problemwhere it
9 The utility level used in the figure is φ(.01) = −.9512, so that UH = {(u(w1), u(w2)) :
U (H, (w1, w2)) = −.9512}.
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is optimal to implement the high-cost action, even if this is impossible with a binding
IR constraint.10
Note that such an example cannot be constructed if ambiguity is modeled using
the non-additive probabilities framework. Formally, this is established in Ghirardato
(1994), Lemma 1, which states that the IR constraint always binds in their model.
In a two outcome world it is easy to understand this result as indifference curves are
piecewise linear (while they are linear under expected utility), parallel lines with only
one kink at the forty-five degree line. So if the indifference curves associated to the
two actions don’t intersect at the reservation utility, they never intersect. If they do, the
intersections corresponding to higher utility levels will be shifted out parallel to the
45 degree line and so they will be always more expensive than the equivalent of the
outside option. The same applies to the expected utility framework, where indifference
curve are not piecewise linear, but linear.
We will show now that this result still extends to some classes of smooth ambi-
guity preferences. To do so, we specialise our model to the case of constant absolute
ambiguity aversion preferences (CAAA), as defined by Klibanoff et al. (2005). Such
preferences correspond to the case where φ(u) = − exp(−αu), with α being a param-
eter measuring the degree of absolute ambiguity aversion.11 The analogy to constant
absolute risk aversion is obvious.
Proposition 1 1. The individual rationality constraint may not bind in an optimal
contract.
2. The individual rationality constraint binds if φ is of the CAAA variety.
A proof is given in the Appendix. To understand the intuition, note that only for
CAAA preferences the standard proof of GH can be followed: Assume a contract sat-
isfies both constraints, but the IR constraint does not bind. Create a second contract,
where utility u(wi ) given any outcome i is lowered by a constant amount. The second
contract is actually preferred by the principal. If the amount is small enough, the IR is
still satisfied. Moreover, the expected utility under any action (and any possible dis-
tribution) decreases by this constant. Hence, under any action, uncertainty about the
expected utility remains the same, except that the mean changes by an equal amount.
This has no effect on the ranking of the different actions (and consequently the IC
constraint) precisely if preferences are of the CAAA variety (including the ambigu-
ity neutral case). Constant ambiguity attitude ensures that the ambiguity premium is
translation invariant, which is in general not the case given the smooth model.12
In principle a similar argument would hold if relative ambiguity aversion (CRAA,
φ(u) = uα)) was constant, and the utility function u would be multiplicatively separa-
10 Note that this example leaves open the question whether the optimal contract would provide the agent
with the lowest utility level under which the IR constraint can hold (given that the IC-constraint binds). A
different example can be constructed that shows that even that is not true.
11 Note that in this case the agent’s preferences could also be represented using other ambiguity models,
including variational preferences (Maccheroni et al. 2006) or the Vector Expected Utility model (Siniscalchi
2009).
12 If one drew a graph analogous to Fig. 1 for CAAA preferences, U ′H is a translation of U H along the
45 degree line using the same vector that makes U ′L a translation of U L , even if neither curve typically
will linear.
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ble in costs andwage, i.e. u(w, a) = cau(w). However we have seen that to ensure that
the IR constraint binds, it is at least necessary that the imageofu can never reach a lower
bound. But then preserving existence actually requires that also limw→w u(w) = −∞.
But this is incompatible with constant relative ambiguity aversion.
In order to facilitate comparisonwith the standardmodel wewill henceforth assume
that preferences are of the CAAA variety. To simplify the notation we will sometimes
continue to use φ(u) even if we have this particular functional form inmind.Moreover
we define the payment necessary to obtain a utility level u by the (increasing) function
h(u) so that h(u(w)) = w. Strict risk aversion implies that h is strictly convex.
We can now state a result for the incentive constraints.
Proposition 2 Suppose the agent’s preferences are CAAA and the principal chooses
not to implement the least-cost action. Then at least one of the incentive constraints
will bind in any optimal solution.
The intuition behind this result is the following: Suppose w is a payment scheme
where no IC constraint binds. Consider a payment scheme w′ where utility levels
u(w′i ) are a convex combination to those of w and the reservation utility. The scheme
w′ still satisfies the IR, as it is less ambiguous, and, if sufficient weight is given to w,
all incentive constraints, while it is cheaper for the principal, as it is less risky.
Note that often, but not always, this result would also hold if the agent is risk neutral,
but strictly ambiguity averse. To see this, assume the optimal contract is not unam-
biguous (i.e. does not yield the same expected utility under all possible distributions).
Since the payments are more similar between outcomes given w′, this scheme also
strictly reduces ambiguity about the payments for the agent. Thus, underw′ also the IR
constraint does not bind, so that the principal can find yet another contract that satisfies
all the constraints, but entails a lower ambiguity premium. Hence, unless the optimal
contract achieves unambiguous wages, at least one incentive constraint must bind in
the optimal contract even under risk neutrality, provided ambiguity aversion is strict. It
might, however, well be possible that the distribution of wages in an optimal contract
is unambiguous. If, for instance, all possible distributions agree about the probability
that one of the highest two outcomes obtains, a contract which pays the same wage
level for these two outcomes, and a different wage level for all other outcomes, would
result in an unambiguous wage distribution.
We conclude this section by introducing a notation that decomposes the individual’s
beliefs about each action into two parts. Given our restriction to CAAA preferences it
will turn out useful in the following sections to distinguish between the information
about each action that is relevant also for an ambiguity neutral agent, and the part
that is relevant only to ambiguity averse agents. Thus, we will denote the average




and the difference between a distribution pa and the average p¯a by pˆa . Hence the
ambiguity associated with each action can be described by the measure μˆa , where
μˆa( pˆa) ≡ μa( pˆa + p¯a) for any pˆa ∈ supp(μa) − { p¯a}.
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p¯ai h(ui ) s.t. u ∈ [img(u)]I and
∑
i
p¯ai ui − ca − Fa(u) ≥ u0 (IR)
∑
i




i ui − ca
′ − Fa′(u) ∀a′ ∈ A, (IC)




exp[−α ∑i pˆi ui ]dμˆa . The advantage of this approach is that
it highlights the effect of ambiguity aversion. Here Fa(u) represents the ambiguity
premium that the principal needs to pay to the agent. In the individual rationality
constraint, the ambiguity premium is the only difference to the standard framework
with an unambiguous distribution of p¯a . For the incentive constraints, the effect of
ambiguity aversion corresponds to the difference between the ambiguity premia of the
two actions. Via the IR constraint ambiguity aversion will always have a non-positive
effect for the principal’s profits, the effect via the IC constraint could go either way.
4 Optimal incentives: the two outcome case
To get a first understanding of how the addition of ambiguity affects the solution to
the principal-agent problem, we reduce the model to the case of two outcomes only. In
particular, we showhow the properties of the optimal contract differ from the case of no
ambiguity aversion, and how changes in ambiguity aswell as ambiguity aversion affect
the principal’s profits. An additional advantage of the two-outcome case is that it is rel-
atively easy to give a definition of the relative degree of ambiguity of two actions,which
will turn out to be an important factor in determining the optimal incentive scheme.
In this section,we call outcome 2 ‘success’, and outcome 1 ‘failure’. The ambiguous
viewof the outcomedistribution for each actiona cannowbedescribedby a cumulative
distribution function μa(p) (defined for p ∈ [0, 1]), representing the confidence in
potential success probabilities, or alternatively by the average success probability
p¯H and the cdf μˆa( pˆ). The latter represents the cumulative likelihood attributed to
deviations about the average success rate, its support is is a subset of the interval
[− p¯a, 1 − p¯a]. With two outcomes the payment scheme can be understood as a
guaranteed payment, w1, and a bonus w2 − w1 that is paid only in case of success.
Correspondingly we define uF = u(w1) to be the utility level corresponding to a
failure, and u = u(w2) − u(w1) to be the “utility bonus” in case of success.
We will focus on explaining how ambiguity affects the principal’s problem of
implementing a given action a. The principal wishes to minimise the costs of imple-
mentation,
p¯ah(uF + u) + (1 − p¯a)h(uF )
subject to the constraints that her payment schemegiven by (uF , uF +uΔ) ∈ [img(u)]2
induces outcome a and is acceptable for the agent. After straightforwardmanipulations
these constraints become
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∀a′ ∈ A. (IC) (2)
This reformulation facilitates identifying the effects that ambiguity aversion has
on the constraint set. It is easy to see that the first-best outcome is not affected by
ambiguity aversion: If the action was contractible, the IC-constraint becomes obsolete
and the optimal incentive scheme satisfies the IR constraint with a constant wage
scheme (uF = u0 + cH with uΔ = 0), so that all ambiguity disappears. But as the
IC constraint has to be satisfied, a non-constant incentive scheme has to be used,
so that ambiguity will matter. Compared to an agent without ambiguity aversion the
term Fa(uΔ) describes the effect of ambiguity aversion on the individual rationality
constraint, while Fa(uΔ) − Fa′(uΔ) denotes the effect on the IC constraint. If action
a is ambiguous, it follows immediately that for all non-constant contracts, ambiguity
aversion tightens the IR constraint, while the effect on the IC constraint could go
either way. We introduce the following definition to identify the cases in which an IC
constraint becomes more or less restrictive.
Definition 1 Action a′ is more ambiguous than a if μˆa′ is a mean preserving spread
of μˆa .13
Note that our definition implies that if action a is preferred to action a′ (which is
more ambiguous) by an ambiguity neutral agent under any wage contract, action a
will (ceteris paribus) also be preferred by an ambiguity averse agent, as stated in the
following proposition. The result is very intuitive since if an action is more ambiguous,
it will become less attractive to an ambiguity averse decision maker.
Proposition 3 Suppose the principal wants to implement action a (which is not the
cheapest action), and ambiguity aversion raises from zero to a positive level. Then
the incentive constraint associated to action a′ becomes more restrictive if a is more
ambiguous, and less restrictive if a is less ambiguous than a′.
Proof The result follows from (2) since if a is more ambiguous,Fa(u)−Fa′(u) ≥
0, while if a′ is more ambiguous, the inequality is reversed. 
unionsq
Yet, this observation is not enough to study the effects of ambiguity aversion on
the principal’s profits. The fact that it becomes harder to implement the action that
is optimal in the absence of ambiguity, does not necessarily mean that the profits of
the principal have to decrease. It might still be the case that another action becomes






cheaper to implement, so that the principal might actually benefit when she changes
the action she implements with the optimal contract. To abstract from such concerns,
we turn to the case of two actions.
Two actions Suppose there are only two actions, so that A = {H, L} with cH > cL . It
follows immediately that the low-cost action is optimally implemented with a constant
incentive scheme. Thus the problem is only interesting if p¯H > p¯L , as otherwise the
principal prefers to implement the low-cost action. Another convenient feature of this
simplification is that whenever we find that the principal can implement the high-cost
action in some principal-agent problem, we can easily construct another problem (by
raising q2 − q1) such that implementing the high-cost action is not only efficient, but
also optimal for the principal. Thus we now seek to characterise the incentive scheme
that optimally implements the high-cost action. (Whether it is in fact optimal to do so
will only depend on the size of q2 − q1.)
In the standard model, the optimal contract pays a positive wage bonus if the agent
achieves the high outcome. Wage and bonus are determined by the unique point at
which the IR constraint and the (one) IC constraint bind. Also under ambiguity (at
least assuming constant absolute ambiguity attitude) we know (from above) that in
the optimal solution the two constraints bind. Recall that for any (uF , uF + uΔ) ∈
[img(u)]2 these two constraints have the form
uF + p¯H u − cH ≥ u0 + F H (u) (IR) (3)
and
( p¯H − p¯L)u ≥ cH − cL + F H (u) − F L(u). (IC) (4)
If the constraint set is empty, then it is impossible to implement the high-cost
action. Otherwise the high-cost action can be implemented, and the two conditions
holdwith equality.However,while this is a necessary condition for anoptimal incentive
scheme, it is not sufficient under ambiguity aversion.While under expected utility both
constraints bind only at one point (corresponding to a positive bonus), under ambiguity
aversion theymight also bind for a negative bonus.Under the smooth ambiguitymodel,
it is even possible that both constraints bind for multiple contracts with a bonus of
the same sign.14 Which of these should the principal pick? Lemma 2 in the Appendix
states that among those contracts with the same sign it will be the one corresponding to
the lowest absolute value of uΔ.15 This is very intuitive. A lower utility bonus makes
the incentive scheme both less risky and less ambiguous, and thus it becomes cheaper
for the principal to satisfy the agent’s IR condition. It is however not always the case
that the optimal contract is one with a positive bonus.
14 This is not the case for CEU or maxmin preferences, as indifference curves are linear on each side of
the 45 degree line.
15 Note that there always is such a smallest contract as the constraint set is closed due to the continuity of
the utility function.
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4.1 Monotonicity
We introduce now an example that illustrates that it is possible that the IC constraint
binds for both a positive and a negative value of u, and that it can be optimal to
choose the negative bonus.
Example 2 In this example, both the high-cost and the low-cost action result in the
good outcome with almost the same (low) probability, but only the low-cost action is
ambiguous. The details are the following: The high-cost action leads to success with
the unambiguous probability p¯H = .22, the low cost action has an average success
rate of p¯L = .19. For the low-cost action, the agent attributes probability .5 to the
deviations −.19 and .19. The costs of the actions are cL = 1 and cH = 1.05, the
reservation utility is φ(u0) = −1. Ambiguity attitude is CAAA with an ambiguity
coefficient α = 5, risk attitude is given by the function u(x) = x 211 for x ≥ 0. Figure 2
illustrates that the optimal contract uses a negative wage bonus.
To understand the intuition for the optimality of the negative bonus in this example,
consider first a monotonic contract (CM) corresponding to an expected utility level of
u0 (given the distribution p¯H ) and an utility difference of u. If, as in this example,
p¯H < 1/2, the potential gain (1 − p¯H )uΔ is larger, but less likely, than the potential
loss of p¯H uΔ (high upside risk). Now compare this with an analogous non-monotonic
contract (CN) with the same expected utility (under p¯H ) as CM, where however the
difference in utility corresponds to −u. The potential gain of p¯H u realizes now
with a probability of 1 − p¯H , so it is smaller, but more likely, than the possible loss
(high downside risk). Whether the monotonic or the non-monotonic contract is now
cheaper for the principal depends on the agent’s utility function. In particular, the
non-monotonic contract can be shown to be prefered if h′′′ > 0.
In the absence of ambiguity aversion it would however be clearly the case that
only the first of the two suggested contracts can provide incentives for the high-cost
action. Given ambiguity aversion, this is not the case any more. The reason is that




in this example, given a monotonic contract like CM, the ambiguity averse decision
maker effectively acts as if she puts a probability of somewhere between 0 and .19
(depending on the level of ambiguity aversion) to the low-cost action. Given however
a non-monotonic contract like CN, she acts as if she puts a probability somewhere
between .19 and .38 to the low cost action. If ambiguity aversion is high enough so
that the effective probability is above .22, incentives for H can be provided with such a
contract. Hence, if CM is actually the best monotonic contract, CNwill probably fail to
provide incentives, but a very similar contract with slightly more powerful incentives
would succeed. Provided the shape of u favors the second type of contract (with high
downside risk) it could be the case that even the required modification of CN remains
cheaper than CM.
A similar example is discussed in Ghirardato (1994, example 1 in Sect. 3.4) for the
case of the non-additive utility model, which is also driven by the fact that a less
ambiguous action is implemented. We will now identify conditions that ensure that
the optimal incentive scheme uses a positive bonus.
The following proposition will provide necessary conditions that ensure that the
optimal contract is monotonic even under ambiguity aversion. To do so, we introduce
a definition of symmetric ambiguity.
Definition 2 Ambiguity about actiona is symmetric if the distribution μˆa is symmetric
(i.e., if 1 − μˆa( pˆ) = μˆa(− pˆ) for all pˆ ∈ supp(μˆa)).
In words, this definition requires that the likelihood that the agent assigns to the
possibility that the success probability deviates from the average success probability
by more than any non-negative number pˆ is the same as the likelihood she assigns to
a deviation of less than − pˆ.
Proposition 4 Suppose that there are only two actions and two outcomes. Then, the
optimal incentive scheme to implement the high-cost action will use a positive bonus
if at least one of these three conditions holds:
1. The high-cost action is at least as ambiguous as the low-cost action.
2. It is unambiguous that the success probability of the low-cost action is lower than
the average success rate for the high-cost action, in the sense that p ∈ supp(μL)
implies p¯H > p.
3. Ambiguity is symmetric for both actions and
– either p¯H ≥ 1/2 and h′′′ ≥ 0
– or p¯H ≤ 1/2 and h′′′ ≤ 0.
A complete proof is given in the Appendix. It proceeds by showing that, provided
the low (cost) action is more ambiguous, it can be possible to implement the action
with strictly higher costs even if the average success rates are the same. As discussed
for the example, the sign of h′′′ characterizes whether or not the positive bonus is
optimal in this case. The proof concludes with the observation that any increase in
the average success rate of the high-cost action ceteris paribus favors the monotone
contract.
Note that the second point implies that, if the likelihood ratio for the high-cost
action is unambiguously higher than for the low-cost action, the optimal contract
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Fig. 3 An increase in ambiguity
aversion can increase profits
is monotonic. In Sect. 5 we will show that such a condition would however not be
sufficient for the case of three outcomes. First, though, we will complete the analysis
of the two-outcome case by examining some comparative statics in ambiguity aversion
and in ambiguity.
4.2 An increase in ambiguity aversion
We now evaluate the impact of the introduction of ambiguity aversion on the profits
of the principal, and more generally, the effects of an increase in ambiguity aversion.
Recall that in the standard model the introduction of risk aversion can never be ben-
eficial to the principal. Moreover, for the case of two outcomes, GH establish that an
increase in risk aversion always lowers the payoff of the principal if the agent has
CARA preferences that are multiplicatively separable in effort costs and wages. This
raises the question whether corresponding results are valid for the case of ambiguity
aversion. The answer is no, as shown by the following example.
Example 3 In this example there is no ambiguity about the consequences of the more
costly action H . That is, the (stochastic) consequences of the action H are perfectly
understood. However, the consequences of the low-cost action L are ambiguous.16
Figure 3 illustrates how to implement action H . Recall that for the principal, outcome
2 is more desirable (in the sense that q2 > q1). The curve UH identifies all those incen-
tive schemes which leave an agent with low ambiguity aversion indifferent between
selecting the high-cost action, and rejecting to work for the principal (her outside
option), i.e. UH = {(u(w1), u(w2)) : U (H, (w1, w2)) = φ(u0)}. This curve is linear
16 In particular, uncertainty is described by pH21 = pH22 = .8, pL21 = 1, pL22 = 0 and μL1 = .6. This
implies that while the high-cost action is unambiguous, the other action is extremely ambiguous. Costs are




as the high-cost action is not ambiguous. UL is the equivalent for the low-cost action.
Any optimal incentive scheme corresponds to an intersection of these two curves, as
has been argued in the context of Fig. 2. Finally, the curve  (the shape of which is
determined by h) depicts all incentive schemes which results in the same profits as V
(assuming that H is chosen), and points below  increase profits.
The curves U ′L and U ′H represent the same indifference curves after an increase in
ambiguity aversion. As H is not ambiguous, onlyU ′L changes; it’s curvature increases.
We can see that the optimal incentive scheme is given by V ′ in this case, and as V ′
lies below , V ′ is cheaper for the principal than V . Thus, the principal benefits from
ambiguity aversion in this example.
The idea behind this example is intuitive: If the action we want to implement is
not ambiguous, then an increase in ambiguity aversion makes it less attractive for the
agent to pick the other action. Therefore, the principal can use a less high-powered
incentive scheme, which is cheaper for her, due to the agent’s risk aversion.
So when will it be true that an increase in ambiguity aversion leads to a decrease in
profits? To keep things simple, we use the case of no ambiguity aversion as benchmark
and identify in which cases ambiguity aversion is beneficial to the principal. Note that
ambiguity aversion affects the set of feasible incentive schemes in two different ways:
Whenever the action that is supposed to be implemented is ambiguous, and a non-
constant incentive scheme is used, ambiguity aversionmakes the individual rationality
constraint harder to satisfy. On the other hand ambiguity aversion may have a positive
or a negative effect on the incentive constraint: If the high-cost action is less ambiguous,
then ambiguity aversion makes the high-cost action relatively more attractive than the
low-cost action. This intuition leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 5 Consider a principal-agent problem (P) with an ambiguity neutral
agent, and the same problem but with an ambiguity averse agent (P ′). Suppose that
the high-cost action is more ambiguous than the low-cost action. Then the profits in
problem P ′ can be no higher than the profits in problem P. If, instead, the high-cost
action is less ambiguous, then profits may be higher in problem P ′.
Proof Assume that the high-cost action is more ambiguous. We will proof the propo-
sition by arguing that the set of incentive schemes that implements the high-cost action
in problem P ′ is contained in the feasible set of problem P [compare (3) and (4)].
Consider first any incentive scheme (given by uF and uΔ) that does not satisfy the
individual rationality constraint in problem P . The IR constraint of problem P ′ differs
by F H (uΔ) which is non-negative. Thus, the IR constraint cannot hold in problem
P ′. Similarly, suppose the IC constraint was violated in P . The incentive constraint of
problem P ′ differs by F H (u) − F L(u). As the high-cost action is more ambigu-
ous, F H (u) − F L(u) ≥ 0, and thus the incentive constraint cannot be satisfied in
problem P ′ as well, establishing the claim. For the case that the high-cost action is less
ambiguous, assume, for example, that it is not ambiguous at all (while the low-cost
action is ambiguous). Consider the optimal contract in (P). Given strict risk aversion,
the IC constraint is binding. For this contract, in problem (P ′), F H (u) = 0 and
F L(u) > 0. Hence, the IR constraint holds with equality, while the IC constraint
holds with a strict inequality. As the proof of Proposition 2 demonstrates, this means
that a strictly better contract is available in problem (P ′). 
unionsq
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In principle we could try to obtain a similar statement for an increase in ambiguity
aversion that starts from an already positive level. However this would require stronger
assumptions about the dominance-relationship between the two actions. (The problem
we face is essentially caused by the fact that CARA preferences are ordered by Arrow-
Pratt risk aversion but not by the stronger relationship of Ross risk aversion. The
same issue arises for CAAA preferences.) In Example 8 of the Appendix we present
an example where, in the context of Proposition 5, the initial effect of introducing
ambiguity aversion goes in the opposite direction of a further increase in ambiguity
aversion. In this example, the high-cost action is very ambiguous compared to the low-
cost action, such that the (negative) effects of ambiguity about the high-cost action
are strong already for a small level of ambiguity aversion, while the positive effects
of ambiguity about the low-cost action become relevant only after a further increase
in ambiguity aversion.
In conclusion, we can observe that while in the standard model with two outcomes
and CARA preferences an increase in absolute risk aversion reduces profits, in our
model with CAAA preferences the introduction of ambiguity aversion (or a marginal
increase of ambiguity aversion) may also benefit the principal. As a change in ambigu-
ity aversion does not alter the first-best outcome, the change in the principal’s problem
reflects the change in the severity of the inefficiency due to moral hazard. To under-
stand this difference between risk aversion and ambiguity aversion intuitively, note
that in the standard model risk aversion is the only source of inefficiencies. Whenever
the high-cost action is not very risky, but the low cost action is, the incentive prob-
lem is not very severe in the first place. For CARA preferences the positive effect of
risk aversion, providing stronger incentives in a given contract, is dominated by the
negative effect (a higher risk premium is required keeping incentives fixed).
4.3 Increases in ambiguity
It is easy to see that an increase in ambiguity that affects only the high-cost action can
never benefit the principal (both constraints becomemore restrictive),while an increase
in ambiguity of the low-cost action can never harm the principal (the IC becomes less
restrictive). However it is less immediate whether an increase in ambiguity that affects
both actions in the sameway is beneficial to the principal.Onemight expect that such an
uniform increase in ambiguity might have similar effects to an increase in ambiguity
aversion. However, this turns out not to be true: While Proposition 5 showed that
introducing ambiguity aversion cannot benefit the principal if the high-cost action is
more ambiguous, a uniform increase in ambiguity can never benefit the principal in
the opposite case, if initially the high-cost action is less ambiguous. To state this result
more precisely, we introduce the following definition.
Definition 3 Suppose that for both actions a ∈ {H, L}, μˆ′a represents ambiguity
for the principal-agent problem P ′, while μˆa describes ambiguity in P , and that the
two problems are identical otherwise. Then problem P ′ differs from P by a uniform
increase in ambiguity if ambiguity about all actions increases by the same mean




Fig. 4 A uniform increase in
ambiguity aversion might
increase profits even if the more
ambiguous action is
implemented
Proposition 6 Suppose the high-cost action is more ambiguous. Then a uniform
increase in ambiguity may increase the principal’s profit. However, if the high-cost
action is less ambiguous, then a uniform increase in ambiguity can never be beneficial
to the principal.
The proof for the case that the high-cost action is less ambiguous is given in the
Appendix. The intuition behind the result is the following: When the less ambiguous
action is to be implemented, and ambiguity increases uniformly, the positive effect
of ambiguity aversion on the incentive constraint remains. However, the relative dif-
ference in the ambiguity of the two actions decreases, reducing this positive effect
(operating via the IC constraint). In addition, the increase in ambiguity reinforces
the negative effect (via the IR constraint). On the other hand, if the more ambiguous
action is to be implemented, the fact that the relative difference in ambiguity between
the two action decreases, reduces the negative effect of ambiguity aversion on the IC
constraint. Still, the negative effect on the IR constraint remains, so that the outcome
depends on the relative size of these two effects. The example below shows that the
net effect can still be positive.
Example 4 In this example, the low-cost action is not ambiguous, but the high-cost
action is. V denotes the optimal incentive scheme. The primed counterparts correspond
to a modified problem, which differs only for by a uniform increase in ambiguity.17 In
Fig. 4, the indifference curves UH and UL are defined as in previous examples, and V
denotes the optimal incentive schemes. As  denotes the set of all incentive schemes
17 Average success rates for H are given by p¯H = p¯′H = .7. The distributions μˆH and μˆ′H are uniform
distributions with support supp(μˆH ) = {−.3, 0, .3} and respectively, supp(μˆ′H ) = {−.3, .3}. Average
success rates for L are given by p¯L = p¯′L = .4. In the unprimed case, there is no ambiguity about the
success rate, in the primed case the deviations in supp(μˆ′L ) = {−.3, 0, .3} are attributed with likelihoods
μ′H1 = μ′H3 = 1/6 and μ′H2 = 2/3. Risk attitude is given by h(u) = u1.5.
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that are equally expensive as V , and V ′ is below , the principal prefers the uniform
increase in ambiguity.
Comparing Propositions 5 and 6 shows that the effects of ambiguity aversion and
a uniform increase in ambiguity can be quite different. Consider for instance the case
where the high-cost action is not ambiguous. In this case an increase in ambiguity aver-
sion can never decrease the principal’s payoff (even if ambiguity starts at some already
positive level), but a uniform increase in ambiguity can never increase the payoff. So
in this case the two changes lead to an opposite effect profits. The opposing effects
of ambiguity and ambiguity aversion illustrate an advantage of working with a model
that can separate ambiguity and ambiguity aversion, like the smooth ambiguity model.
5 Extensions
We now discuss the robustness of our findings to more general formulations of the
principal agent problem. We begin with dropping the restriction to two outcomes, and
revisit the issues of monotonicity and the effects of ambiguity and ambiguity aversion.
Finally, we look at the case of multiple actions.
5.1 Multiple outcomes: monotonicity
Recall that in the absence of ambiguity themonotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP)
is a sufficient condition to guarantee themonotonicity of the optimal incentive scheme,
as long as there are only two actions. For the case of only two outcomes we have
introduced a modification of this property for ambiguous outcome distributions that
ensures that the optimal contract is monotonic even given ambiguity aversion. We will
now demonstrate using an example that for more than two outcomes even a natural,
but very demanding analogue of the MLRP property under ambiguity is not sufficient
to ensure monotonicity of the reward scheme.
Definition 4 The actions H and L satisfy the strong monotone likelihood ratio








This is actually a very restrictive adoption of the MLRP property, as we require
that the agent’s likelihood ratios have to be monotone even if we use two different
(possible) probability distributions to compute the likelihood ratio for two different
outcomes. Note that in particular this assumption also implies that the likelihood ratios
computed using the average probabilities ( p¯H and p¯L ) aremonotonic.However, it does
not suffice to ensure monotonicity, as the analyses of the example below will demon-
strate. The example is motivated in an applied economic context, to illustrate that the
optimality of non-monotonic schemes is not only a purely theoretical possibility.
Example 5 Consider the relationship between a firm (as a principal) and an agent who
is hired to increase sales of the principal’s company. That is, the agent’s job is to do
marketing for the principal’s product. The outcome is the quantity of products sold,
which is the only contractible measurement of the agent’s performance. Assume the
agent has access to an innovative marketing technology. Assume that the firm has a
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good understanding of the distribution of sales in the absence of any marketing efforts
(and this information can be made available to the agent). With respect to the effects
of the marketing technology, suppose that there a two types of consumers. The firm
knows how the marketing technology affects the sales for one type of consumer (type
1). This could be e.g. the younger consumers whose social media activities generate
lots of data about them. There is however not much information about the remaining
(type 2) consumers, so the probability that such a consumer buys after marketing
efforts can be considered ambiguous.
In designing the optimal incentive scheme, the principal combines the unambiguous
information about the type 1 consumers with the ambiguous information about the
other types. If the chance of buying for a consumer is around .5, there could be reason
to expect that intermediate sales are less ambiguous than deviations to either side of
the average. We will illustrate this using the simple case of only two consumers, one
of each type. In the absence of any marketing efforts, both consumers buy one unit
of the good with probability .5 − γ . As motivated above, if the agent exerts effort,
her marketing technology increases the probability that type 1 consumes the good to
.5. In the absence of better information, principal and agent consider the three values
.5+ d, .5 and .5− d as possible consumption probabilities for type 2 consumers (and
they consider them to be equally likely). The parameter d could thus be interpreted as
representing a dimension of ambiguity. Table 2 summarizes this example.
Note that if the agent exerts effort, the probabilities associated to a sales quantity
of 0 and 2, but not to a quantity of 1, are ambiguous.
Obviously, there aremanycombinations of the parametersγ andd such that SMLRP
holds. However, for all of them, given a fixed level of ambiguity aversion, the optimal
contract will not be monotonic whenever risk aversion is sufficiently small. (Lemma
5 in the Appendix states this observation in a slightly more general context and gives
a proof.)
The result is largely driven by the fact that if ambiguity and ambiguity aversion is
high compared to risk aversion, the principal wants to reduce ambiguity by devising a
wage scheme that does not vary a lot between the two ambiguous outcomes. Suppose
p¯H2 > p¯
L
2 , as in this example and consider a payment scheme that is even constant
between the two ambiguous outcomes (1 and 3, corresponding to 0 or 2 units sold).
Since p¯L1 + p¯L3 > p¯H1 + p¯H3 , the payment for the unambiguous outcome 2 (1 unit)
must the highest in order to provide the necessary incentives. If risk aversion is strict,
however, such a scheme will be, informally speaking, too risky, as in the absence of
ambiguity aversion, the shape of the contract should reflect the average (increasing)










0 (.5 + γ )2 .5 (.5 − d) .25 .5 (.5 + d)
1 2 (.25 − γ 2) .5 .5 .5
2 (.5 − γ )2 .5 (.5 + d) .25 .5 (.5 − d)
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Fig. 5 Ambiguity and the
optimal wage schedule
scheme will thus reward the highest outcome more than the lowest, but if risk aversion
is small compared to ambiguity aversion, the result could be that outcome two (one
unit sold) still is rewarded most.
To further illustrate which factors contribute to the optimality of non-monotonic
incentive schemes, Fig. 5 (obtained using numericalmethods) shows that high ambigu-
ity (reflected by increases in the parameter d) plays a similar role as low risk aversion.18
We chose the case of γ = .2, with μH1 = μH3 = .5 which implies that SMLRP holds
whenever d < .28. The optimal incentive scheme is non-monotonic as soon as ambi-
guity is large enough, even in situations where the likelihood ratios satisfy SMLRP.
With only one member of each type the example is arguably not very general, but
note also when we have n members of each group, the probability assigned to selling
exactly n units is still unambiguous. The fact that one outcome is not ambiguous at all
is driven by the assumption that average success probabilities are .5 in both markets.
Without this assumption, typically no outcome will be completely unambiguous, but
a non-monotone incentive scheme might still be optimal.
Additionally, note that it may sometimes be possible for the agent to hide parts of
the output that is produced (as she contributes to its creation), and in a non-monotonic
incentive scheme it is in her interest to do so. In such cases the principal would not
want to use a non-monotonic incentive scheme. If this additional constraint binds, the
optimal incentive schemewould treat some outcomes identically, resulting in a coarser
incentive scheme than one would expect in the absence of ambiguity.
Figure 5 also points to a further difference between moral hazard under risk and
ambiguity. Within the expected utility framework, the optimal contract can be viewed
as if it was the solution to an inference problem. The optimal contract looks as if the
principal makes use of any signal that informs her about the unobservable action of
the agent. Here, this is not the case since the distinction between the output level 1 and
2 is not used for a certain value of d in the optimal contract, even if this is certainly
informative about the chosen action.19
18 To complete the picture, observe that increasing ambiguity aversion instead of ambiguity would have
similar effects.
19 Lang (forthcoming) identifies a different channel which leads to the failure of this analogy, which is




5.2 Multiple outcomes: comparative statics
In our results on the effect of ambiguity and ambiguity aversion, the definition of
the relationship “more ambiguous” was the only aspect specific to the case of only
two outcomes. Hence, these findings generalise quite directly to the case of many
outcomes if a more general notion of the relation ’more ambiguous’ between two acts
can be found. Recall that our definition of this relationship for the two-outcome case
had the property that whenever two actions could be ranked, the disutility attributed
to ambiguity alone [which we denoted by Fa(u)] was (weakly) larger for the more
ambiguous action irrespective of the wage schedule that is used.
In fact, one can also define a relation between two actions that has this property for
the case of more than two actions. One possibility to do so is:
Definition 5 Let, for a fixed u, F(u,μˆa) denote the cdf attributed to the real-valued
random variable constructed by
∑
i pˆi ui , where pˆ is distributed according to μˆ
a .
Action a is at least as ambiguous as a′ if for every possible u, F(u,μˆa) is a mean
preserving spread of F
(u,μˆa′ ).
In fact, this definition is similar to the one introduced by Jewitt and Mukerji (2015) to
compare ambiguous acts. To see an example of two actionswhich are ranked according
to this criterion in a three outcome world, let pˆ = (2,−,−) and suppose that the
support of μa and μa
′
contain at least the three possible probability distributions
p1 = p¯ + pˆ, p2 = p¯ and p3 = p¯ − pˆ. If μ1 = μ3 = α and μ2 = β − 2α, ambiguity
increases as α (or ) increases according to the above definition. Based on such a
definition, we can state the following result:
Proposition 7 Suppose there are only two actions. Suppose the high-cost action is at
least as ambiguous as the low-cost action. Suppose problem P and P ′ are identical,
except that the agent in P is ambiguity neutral, while she is ambiguity averse in P ′.
Then profits are (weakly) lower in problem P ′.
This result includes the cases where only the low-cost action is unambiguous, and
where the two actions are equally ambiguous. The proof does not differ in any essential
way from the two outcome case, and is hence omitted. If H is at least as ambiguous
according to the above definition, ambiguity aversion makes both constraints harder
to satisfy.
Comparing ambiguity of two actions in this way has two limitations. On the one
hand it is not necessarily easy to check whether two actions can be ranked according
to this criterion (unless if actions are equally ambiguous or only one of them is).
On the other hand, often this definition cannot rank two actions. As an example it is
impossible to compare the action which is perceived to result with equal likelihood
in the two probability distributions p¯ ± (, 0,−) with the action that may result
in both p¯ ± (0, ,−) with equal chances. However, under any monotone incentive
scheme the first distribution is more vulnerable to ambiguity aversion than the latter.
Hence, if the first action was considered more ambiguous our results would still apply
if contracts are restricted to be monotonic (In fact, Jewitt andMukerji (2015) provide a
characterization of this relationship under the restriction to monotonic utility profiles
as well). However, as our results suggest that if risk aversion is small compared to
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ambiguity aversion, the optimal contract will not be monotonic in many cases. Hence,
a broader definition of the relationship “more ambiguous than” might be particularly
useful in cases where risk aversion is large, or agents have the possibility to hide
output, so that the optimal contract is forced to be monotonic.
If the action chosen in the optimal contract is unambiguous, we can also show how
marginal increases in ambiguity aversion affect the principal’s payoff, even if there
are many outcomes.
Proposition 8 Suppose there is no ambiguity about the action which is implemented
in the optimal contract. Then any increase in ambiguity aversion (weakly) improves
the payoffs of the principal (and thus reduces the severity of the incentive problem).
The proof, located in the Appendix, exploits parallels between risk aversion and
ambiguity aversion. It is intuitive since if an ambiguity averse agent finds the ambigu-
ous off-equilibrium actions not attractive enough given a certain contract, a more
ambiguity averse agent will find them even less attractive.
Recall our earlier observation that in many cases it seems likely that equilibrium
actions are maybe very well understood in many instances of actual principal-agent
problems, while the consequences of deviations, which never actually occur, are
ambiguous. Hence, this proposition suggests that in many relevant cases the effects
of increases in ambiguity aversion are very different from the effects of risk aversion,
which are more typically attributed to lower profits.20
Obviously an analogous result exists if the principals wants to implement an action
that is ambiguous, while the other is not: In this case, an increase in ambiguity aversion
can only harm the principal.
Also, working with more than two outcomes enables us to contrast the effects of
increases in ambiguity about the outcome distribution with an increase in risk about
the outcomes. In the example below, we show that the fact that the high-cost action
becomes more risky does not mean that profits decrease.
Example 6 Suppose Q = {0, 1, 2} and p¯a = (γ, 1 − 2γ, γ ) (for γ ∈ [0, .5]). As γ
increases, the risk inherent in the outcome distribution increases. Yet, that does not
mean that any payment scheme based on these three outcomes necessarily becomes
worse for the agent: any payment scheme that treats the lower two outcomes similar
and rewards the high output with the highest wage becomes in fact better for the agent
as γ increases. If a is the high-cost action, and the low-cost action is described by, say,
the distribution (.5, .25, .25), values of γ that are close to 1/2 will bring the principal
close to the first-best outcome, even though the outcome distribution is most risky in
this case. This follows as the high-cost action comes close to not having full support
in this case, so that the principal can ‘punish’ the agent in a state that is likely only
under the low-cost action.
20 Note that this proposition remains obviously true in a case of many actions, provided the equilibrium
action is the only unambiguous one.
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Fig. 6 IC binds only for an
action with higher costs
5.3 Multiple actions
In general, increasing the number of actions available to the agent does not change
the problem in a fundamental way: The principal first checks what are the costs of
implementing any possible action (where she now has to satisfy multiple incentive
constraints), and then she compares these costs to the expected output the correspond-
ing action generates. However, smooth ambiguity aversion introduces one important
difference: it is no longer true that one of the incentive constraints that binds has to
correspond to an action with lower costs. (This has to be true in the standard model
and if ambiguity is modelled using capacities.) We illustrate using an example.
Example 7 In this example, there are two outcomes, and three actions, H , M and L .
Here the medium cost action (represented by the indifference curve UM ) yields the
highest expected benefits for the principal, followed by the high-cost action (UH ). The
cheapest action (UL ) is also least beneficial to the principal. All of them are ambiguous,
but note that the ambiguity about the high-cost (medium-benefit) action is such that it
becomes significant only if the wage scheme differs a lot between the two outcomes
(which is impossible in the non-additive model).21 If the principal wants to implement
the medium-cost action, her profits are highest if she uses the incentive scheme V ′
(Fig. 6). In this scheme, the agent is indifferent between the medium and high-cost
action, but prefers both to the low cost action. Note that the principal actually wants
21 The details of the example are the following: For action L , the average success rate p¯L = .5, deviations
{ˆ − .2, .2} are equally likely. For M , p¯M = .7 and the deviations {−.15, .15} are equally likely. For H ,
the average success rate is given by p¯H = .675, the deviations {−.275, 0, .275} have likelihoods given by
μH1 = μH3 = .01 and μH2 = .98. The costs of each action are cL = 2, cM = 2.5 and cH = 2.57, the
reservation utility is φ(u0) = −1. Ambiguity attitude is CAAA with an ambiguity coefficient α = 6. The
agent is risk neutral.
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to use this scheme rather than using scheme V to implement H when the benefits of
the higher outcomes are large enough.
6 Conclusion
Given ambiguity about the outcome distributions, we find that allowing for ambiguity
averse preferences has important consequences for the optimal contract. First, unless
preferences display constant absolute ambiguity aversion, some rents may be left with
the agent (the individual rationality constraint need not bind in the optimal contract).
Second, we find that it will more often be the case that the optimal contract is non-
monotonic. In settings were output can be hidden this means that in such cases the
optimal contract will be coarse. This fits well with the often stated belief that the
optimal contract is found to be more coarse than what the expected utility framework
predicts. Third, we find that even in a simple model with binary outcomes increases
in ambiguity aversion can lead to very different effects compared to increases in risk
aversion. More risk aversion typically leads to lower profits, more ambiguity aversion
can easily lead to higher profits, e.g. if there is only very little ambiguity about the
action which is to be implemented, while ambiguity about possible deviations is large.
Additionally, we demonstrate that, given ambiguity averse preferences, the principal’s
problem of finding the optimal incentive contract can no longer be viewed as an
inference problem.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Appendix
Existence of an optimal contract
Lemma 1 There exists an optimal incentive contract.
Proof The proof follows GH (proof of Proposition 1), with the probability distribution
over outcomes in the expected-utility model being replaced by theμ-average propabil-
ity distribution,
∫
pdμa . Observe that the low-cost action can always be implemented
at finite cost. Hence it is sufficient to show that if it is possible to implement any action










pi dμau(wi ) − ca
)
≥ ∫ φ (∑Ii=1 pi u(wi ) − ca
)
dμa ≥
φ(uo). As argued in GH one can thus place artificial bounds on the constraint set in
a way that ensures it becomes closed and bounded. Having assumed continuity of u
and 




Proof of Proposition 1
(The proof of part 1) is established by the example in the text. For part 2, assume








































, ∀a′ ∈ A. ( IC’ )
We use the same technique as GH: Suppose the constraint IR’ does not bind, and
IC’ holds. Replace the payment scheme w with another payment scheme that reduces
utilities given each outcome by the same amount , where  is small enough so that
the IR’ constraint still holds. Such an  exists since the image of u has no lower bound.
Then also the IC’ constraints still hold, as both sides of the inequality get multiplied
by exp(α). But as u is increasing in w, this change clearly benefits the principal, as
implementation costs decrease. 
unionsq
Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose that no IC binds in an optimal solution. Denote the optimal payment scheme
by w∗, and note that it cannot be constant (otherwise, the agent would choose the
least-cost action). Now consider, for some γ ∈ (0, 1) an alternative payment scheme






dμa . This payment scheme








































Since the incentive scheme is not constant, the inequality sign follows from the
strict convexity of h, which is implied by the agent’s strict risk aversion,
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Also, the contract w′ is (weakly) beneficial to the agent, so that the individual







































































The inequality follows from concavity of φ. Thus w′ makes the principal better
off and ensures the I R constraint holds. Assuming γ is close enough to 1, continuity
ensures that also all IC constraints continue to hold givenw′. Hence, there is a contract
w′ that makes the principal better off and satisfies all constraints, contradicting the
optimality of the solution w.
Proof of Proposition 4
We begin by stating a preliminary lemma.
Lemma 2 Suppose two incentive schemes V = (uF , uF + uΔ) and V ′ = (u′F , u′F +
u′Δ) both satisfy the IR and IC constraint with equality and uu′ > 0. Then the
principal will weakly prefer incentive scheme V iff |u| ≤ |u′|. Assuming either strict
risk aversion or strict ambiguity aversion, she will strictly prefer V iff |u| < |u′|.
Proof Pick any two incentive schemes where uu′ > 0 and both constraints bind.
Assume wlog |u| < |u′|. As both schemes satisfy IR,
∫
φ(uF + p¯H uΔ + pˆu)dμˆ( pˆ) =
∫
φ(u′F + p¯H u′Δ + pˆu′)dμˆ( pˆ).
It follows from the concavity of φ that uF + p¯H uΔ ≤ u′F + p¯H u′Δ. The principals
implementation costs using V are given by:
p¯H h(u′F + u′Δ) + (1 − p¯H )h(u′F )
= p¯H h(u′F + p¯H u′Δ + (1 − p¯H )u′Δ) + (1 − p¯)h(u′F + p¯H u′Δ − p¯H u′Δ).
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Using the above inequality,
p¯H h(u′F + p¯H u′Δ + (1 − p¯H )u′Δ) + (1 − p¯)h(u′F + p¯H u′Δ − p¯H u′Δ)
≥ p¯H h(uF + p¯H uΔ + (1 − p¯H )u′Δ) + (1 − p¯H )h(uF + p¯H uΔ − p¯H u′Δ).
Finally, note that due to the convexity of h, and since |u| < |u′|,
p¯H h(uF + p¯H uΔ + (1 − p¯H )u′Δ) + (1 − p¯H )h(uF + p¯H uΔ − p¯H u′Δ)
≥ (1 − p¯H )h(uF + p¯H uΔ − p¯H uΔ) + p¯H h(uF + p¯H uΔ + (1 − p¯H )uΔ).
The right-hand-side of this equation corresponds to the implementation costs for
V . Combining the inequalities gives the result. Note that assuming either strict risk
aversion or strict ambiguity aversion ensures that one of the weak inequalities is in
fact strict as needed for the result. 
unionsq
We now turn to the proof of the three parts of the proposition.
Part 1 As F H (u) − F L(u) is positive in this case, it is clear that the IC constraint
in (4) cannot hold for any negative value of u.
Part 2 Let p′ = sup(supp(μL)). Suppose p¯H ≥ p′ but, by contradiction, uΔ < 0.
Then the term F H (u) − F L(u) as it appears in the IC constraint (4) is larger then
(p′− p¯L)uΔ, since the numerator (of the fraction in the definitionF H (u)−F L(u))
is at least 1 and the denominator at most (exp(−α(p′ − p¯L)uΔ). Therefore it is
necessary for the IC constraint to hold that ( p¯H − p′)uΔ > cH −cL , which contradicts
our assumptions.
Part 3 The proof of part 3 proceeds in the following steps. First we turn to the case
of a principal that tries to implement the more costly action even though the reduced
probabilities are the same. This case however is only interesting as a benchmark case,
since if average probabilities are the same, the ambiguity neutral principal will always
implement the low-cost action using a constant incentive scheme. Lemma 3 belowwill
characterise the sign of the bonus in this case. Finally, we turn to the more interesting
case that p¯H > p¯L and argue that in this case it becomes cheaper to use the positive
bonus (Lemma 4), so that the conditions we identify in Lemma 3 are still sufficient
for the positive bonus, (and moreover necessary for the negative bonus), establishing
the result.
Lemma 3 Suppose that p¯H = p¯L = p¯, action H can be implemented and ambiguity
about both actions is symmetric. If p¯H > 1/2, the principal will use the positive
(negative) bonus if h′′′ is always positive (negative). The result is reversed if p¯H < 1/2.
If h′′′ = 0, then positive and negative bonus are equally expensive.
Proof Consider any incentive scheme V = (uF , uF + u) that implements H . Let
u′F = uF + 2 p¯u and u′ = −uΔ. It follows from Eqs. (3) and (4) that V ′ =
(u′F , u′F + u′) satisfies both constraints iff V does.
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To see this, observe that
∫
exp
(−α pˆ(−u)) dμH ( pˆ) =
∫
exp




(−α pˆu) dμH ( pˆ)
(and similarly for L .) Therefore plugging V ′ instead of V in the IC constraints leaves
the RHS of both constraints unchanged. The LHS of the IR constraints (3) for V and
V ′ are identical as well (by construction), and the LHS of (4) is zero in both cases.
Now let V be the incentive scheme that satisfies both constraints with the smallest
possible positive bonus. It remains to check whether the expected wage payment
associated to V is larger than the expected payment needed for V ′.
To do so, rewrite the two incentive schemes in terms of the deviation about their
mean, u¯ = uF + p¯uΔ. Then, V = (u¯ − p¯u, u¯ + (1 − p¯)u) while V ′ = (u¯ +
p¯u, u¯ − (1 − p¯)u).
Thus, the principal prefers the positive bonus if
(1 − p¯)h(u¯ − p¯u) + p¯h(u¯ + (1 − p¯)u) − [(1 − p¯)h(u¯ + p¯u)
+ p¯h(u¯ − (1 − p¯)u)] < 0.
The LHS of this inequality equals 0 if uΔ = 0. Thus the LHS is negative for uΔ > 0
if it is decreasing in uΔ. The first derivative of the LHS w.r.t. uΔ is actually given by




h′(u¯ + (1 − p¯)u) + 1
2










Now suppose p¯ > 1/2. Since h′′ > 0 this derivative is negative (and thus the
positive bonus is optimal) if, equivalently, h′ is convex or h′′′ > 0. The relationship
is reversed if either p¯ < 1/2 or h′ concave, and if h′ is linear, there is no difference
between the positive and negative bonus.22 
unionsq
Lemma 4 Suppose it is optimal for the principal to implement the high-cost action
using a positive bonus in a principal-agent problem PE , where the reduced success
probabilities are equal (or she is indifferent). Then she will strictly prefer the positive
bonus in any principal-agent problem P that differs from PE only by a decrease in
p¯L .
22 Thus, the principal prefers V iff an expected utility maximizer with convex utility function −h prefers
the (zero mean) lottery (− p¯u, 1 − p¯; (1 − p¯)u, p¯), to the lottery ( p¯u, 1 − p¯;−(1 − p¯)u, p¯) at
wealth level u¯. Another way of proving the proposition could be to verify the fact that the sign of p¯H −1/2
establishes which of the two lotteries third-order stochastic dominates the other, and then to apply the
(unnumbered) Theorem in Whitmore (1970) to obtain the result.)
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Proof Consider the cheapest scheme that implements H in problem P using a negative
bonus. This incentive scheme implements H also in problem PE : The individual
rationality constraints are the same in both cases. Regarding the IC (Eq. 4), the LHS
in problem P equals ( p¯H − p¯L)uΔ which is negative provided that uΔ < 0, while
the LHS of PE equals zero, which makes the constraint easier to satisfy. Thus the
principal weakly prefers the best non-monotone incentive scheme in problem PE to
the best non-monotone incentive scheme of problem P . And in fact this preference
must be strict as for the optimal incentive scheme of PE both constraints must hold
with equality. By assumption, this scheme is (weakly) worse than the best monotone
incentive scheme of problem P . By similar arguments, the best monotone incentive
scheme of problem PE is also a feasible (monotone) scheme in problem P . Thus,
this scheme is strictly better than any non-monotone incentive scheme, and thus the
optimal incentive scheme must be monotone. 
unionsq
Example 8
Example 8 In this example, there is very little ambiguity about the low-cost action,
while ambiguity about the high-cost action is large.The (relevant) details for the exam-
ple are the following: Possible deviations about the average success probability are
{−.2, .2} for H and and {−.2, 0, .2} for L . For the high-cost action the agent puts
the same likelihood on both deviations, (μH1 = μH2 = .5), while for the low-cost
action she considers the average success probability to be by far the most likely:
μL1 = μL3 = .5(1 − μL2 ) = .0005. The graph in Fig. 7 shows, as usual, the indif-
ference curves that corresponds to the outside option for both actions and for three
different levels of ambiguity aversion: The straight lines UH and UL correspond to
no ambiguity aversion. The corresponding dashed curves represents a positive level
of ambiguity aversion(U ′H a nd U ′L ), and an even higher level (U ′′H and U ′′L). For
Fig. 7 An additional increase in
ambiguity aversion
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wage schemes that are close to being constant, the introduction of ambiguity aversion
affects only the high-cost action significantly, making it harder to implement the high-
cost action. But if ambiguity aversion rises to more extreme levels, it has a sizeable
effect on the low-cost action, while the additional effect on the high-cost action is
negligible. The optimal incentive schemes, given by intersections of the respective
two indifference curves, are labelled V, V ′ and V ′′ in increasing order of ambigu-
ity aversion. Even if the agent is risk neutral (so that the principal’s iso-profit curve
is a straight line parallel to U H ), V ′′ is less expensive than V ′ despite the fact that
the high-cost action is more ambiguous and V ′′ is the solution for a problem where
the agent is more ambiguity averse than in the problem corresponding to V ′. Hence
implementation costs are non-monotonic in ambiguity aversion.
Proof of Proposition 6
Let unprimed variables correspond to the principal-agent problem before a uniform
increase in ambiguity aversion, and their primed counterparts denote the problem after
the change. Thus, for both a ∈ {H, L} we can write μˆa′ = μˆa + μ˜. The new incentive
constraint of the primed problem can now be rewritten as






(−α pˆ j u) dμˆH + ∫ exp (−α pˆ j u) dμ˜∫
exp
(−α pˆ j u) dμˆL + ∫ exp (−α pˆ j u) dμ˜
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
F ′H (u)−F ′L (u)
.
The primed IC constraint differs from the unprimed IC only by the last term, which
used to be F H (u) − F L(u) = 1a log(
∫
exp(−α pˆ j u)dμˆH∫
exp(−α pˆ j u)dμˆL ). Fix an arbitrary u that
did not satisfy the incentive constraint. Suppose the high-cost action is less ambiguous.
Then, as the fraction inside this term is less than 1, and since
∫
exp
(−α pˆ j u) dμ˜a >
0, one can conclude that F ′H (u) − F ′L(u) > F H (u) − F L(u). Thus, the
incentive constraint still does not hold. Finally, suppose only the IR constraint fails in
the unprimed problem. Then, as ambiguity of the high-cost action has increased, the
individual rationality constraint continues to fail in the unprimed problem. Therefore
there is no incentive scheme that implements the high-cost action only in the primed
problem, establishing the claim. For the case of a more ambiguous high-cost action
see Example 4.
Formal analysis of Example 5
We proof a lemma to which the example fits as a special case.
Lemma 5 Suppose that there are three outcomes, the agent is strictly ambiguity
averse, only the high-cost action is ambiguous, outcome 2 is not ambiguous, and
SMLRP holds. If p¯L2 / p¯
H
2 = 1, then the incentive scheme is non-monotonic as soon as
the agent is sufficiently close to being risk neutral.
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Proof Suppose that p¯H2 / p¯
L
2 > 1. It is straightforward that the SMLRP assumption













C(u) = p¯H1 h(u1) + p¯H2 h(u2) + p¯H3 h(u3)
subject to





exp(−α pˆ3(u3 − u1))dμH
]
= u0 + cH (5)
p¯L1 u1 + p¯L2 u2 + p¯L3 u3 = u0 + cL . (6)
Let uΔ ≡ u3 −u1. Substituting u3 = u1 +u, the constraints can be re-expressed,
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where F H (uΔ) = 1α log[
∫
exp(−α pˆ3uΔ)dμH .
Denote by (u1(uΔ), u2(uΔ), u3(uΔ)) the utility level corresponding to binding
constraints as defined by the above equations. Note that since F H (0) = 0 and the
denominator in the above three expressions is positive by SMLRP, one can con-
clude from elementary algebraic manipulations that u1(0) = u3(0) < u2(0) is
implied by cH > cL . Also note that since ( p¯H1 + FH
′





conv(supp(μ(a))H ), SMLRP ensures that ( p¯H3 − FH
′





u′1(uΔ) > 0. By similar arguments, u′2(uΔ) < 0 and u′2(uΔ) > 0. It follows that if
u < 0, than u2(uΔ) > u1(uΔ). Hence, the search for the optimal uΔ can be restricted
to the following four regions:
Region 1 (uΔ < 0) Region 2 (uΔ ≥ 0) Region 3 (uΔ > 0) Region 4 (uΔ > 0)
u3(uΔ) < u1(uΔ) <
u2(uΔ)
u1(uΔ) ≤ u3(uΔ) <
u2(uΔ)
u1(uΔ) < u2(uΔ) ≤
u3(uΔ)
u2(uΔ) ≤ u1(uΔ) <
u3(uΔ)
The principal’s problem can be restated as minimizing the function C(uΔ) defined
by C(uΔ) = p¯H1 h(u1(uΔ)) + p¯H2 h(u2(uΔ)) + p¯H3 h(u3(uΔ)).
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We now show that this function is quasi-convex. Its derivative is computed (and
slightly rearranged) below:




























































So apart from a positive, multiplicative constant, C ′ essentially consists of three
terms. First observe, as benchmark, that if h′ was constant, the first two terms cancel
out, so the third term remains. AsF is convex, it follows that in this caseC has a unique
minimum at the point whereFH′(uΔ) = 0, which is the case for uΔ = 0. To verify the
convexity of F H we can write F H (uΔ) = 1α log[
∫
exp(−αpH3 (uΔ))dμH ] + p¯H3 uΔ.
The result follows since exp(−αpH3 uΔ) is log-convex in uΔ as long as pH3 ≥ 0, and
any sum of log-convex functions is log-convex.
To evaluate the effects of risk aversion (h′ is increasing), consider first region 1.
For these values of uΔ, h′(u3(uΔ)) < h′(u1(uΔ)) < h′(u2(uΔ)). As h′(u3(uΔ)) and
h′(u1(uΔ)) enter with positive coefficients in the first two terms in (7), their sum now
becomes negative. Also the third term is negative (since pH2 /p
L




F ′(uΔ) < 0 for uΔ < 0.
Now consider region 2. While the sign of C ′ may vary, we argue that C is convex
in that region: Applying the product rule, focus first on the effect of uΔ via changes in
instances of h′. Recall that for positive uΔ, u′1(uΔ) and u′3(uΔ) > 0while u′2(uΔ) < 0,
and h is convex, so that it is easy to verify that the derivative of the first term of (7) is
positive. Recalling that ( p¯H1 + FH
′




(uΔ)) ∈ conv(supp(μH )),
SMLRP implies that the derivative of the sum of the last two terms together is positive
as well, if FH′ remained constant. Finally, the effect via FH′ has the same sign as
FH′′(uΔ), which is positive.
Regarding the final two regions, observe that the argument for the effect via the







′(u1(uΔ)) + p¯H3 h′(u3(uΔ)
p¯L1 + p¯L3
.
As soon as this condition fails, the bounds on FH′(uΔ) makes it easy to see that
then C ′(uΔ) > 0. Also, if the condition fails for some uΔ it fails also for all higher
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values of uΔ. Finally, observe that irrespective whether or not this condition still holds,
in region 4, C ′(uΔ) > 0.
Thus, C(uΔ) is initially decreasing, then convex, and finally increasing. Thus it has
a unique minimum, which is in either region 2 or region 3. Its local behavior at the
boundary between those two regions characterizes the location of the optimal uΔ.
Denote by ˜uΔ the value that makes the payment scheme constant over outcomes 2
and 3, such that u2( ˜uΔ) = u3( ˜uΔ). Then it is a necessary and sufficient condition for
the optimal incentive scheme to be monotonic that C ′( ˜uΔ) < 0. Note that u1( ˜uΔ) <





h′(u2( ˜uΔ)) − 1)











+ F ′( ˜uΔ)) < 0. (8)
Note that u˜ does not depend on the agent’s attitudes towards risk (as captured by
h). The first term is negative, since u1( ˜uΔ) < u2( ˜uΔ) and we assume SMLRP. We
can interpret this term as the benefit (of reducing costs) due to reducing the riskiness
of the wage scheme, by using a wage scheme that reflects the average likelihood ratio
difference between second and the third outcome. Now consider the second term.
By standard arguments, as long as uΔ > 0 we have that FH′(u˜) > 0. Thus the
second term captures the costs of increasing ambiguity. Consequently, as the utility
function is sufficiently close to representing risk neutral preferences, the second effect
will dominate the first effect so that the optimal contract is in region 2 and hence not
monotonic. The case where p¯H2 / p¯
L
2 < 1 is entirely analogous, with the exception that
an optimal non-monotonic contract will now be in a region where u3 > u1 > u2. 
unionsq
Proof of Proposition 8
Suppose that w is the optimal incentive scheme in a given principal-agent problem.
Suppose the optimal constract implements actiona.Weproof the claimby showing that
w remains feasible after an increase in ambiguity aversion. Note first that this increase
does not affect the individual rationality constraint. As w satisfies each incentive




















We can interpret this condition in a language borrowed from the literature dealing
with risk aversion bynoting that the certainty equivalent of the ambiguous utility lottery
on the left hand side is below
∑I
i=1 p¯ai u(wi ) − ca + ca
′
. What in the context of risk
aversion is a (certain) monetary payment, corresponds to a certain utility level in the
ambiguity framework. Similarly, a lottery offering monetary payments corresponds to
a lottery over utility levels. Consider an increase in ambiguity aversion.We know from
the definition of the term “more ambiguity averse”(analogous to more risk averse) that
an agent that is more ambiguity averse will have an even lower certainty equivalent.
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